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policy of the Yunnan Government has been to reduce to the lowest point even the pretence of a military force. The few soldiers who existed in West Yübnan declined to leave their homes, and the forces, as finally constituted, were made up of all the beggars, loafers, and "dead-beats" off the streets, none of whom had the smallest idea of any sort of discipline, or of even how to fire off a rifle. Straggling anyhow along the road in groups of five or six, laden with pumpkins, corn, and vegetables which they had purloined, these dirty rascals resembled votaries of Ceres rather than of Mars, Proclamations were put out that "a great army is passing, but not even the chickens need be frightened." In point of fact, the chickens all along the ronte had the liveliest cause for alarm, and if the soldiers slay as many lamas as they have stolen chickens, the rebellion will very speedily be suppressed. The provincial Ti-t'ai, or Commander-in-chief, at Ta Li had only thirty or forty men, most of whom flatly declined to budge, and his Excellency had to start for the wars at the head of a motley crowd or verminous ragamuffins, driven off the streets into his yamên.
The appearance and behaviour of the detachment, nominally of 500 men sent down from Yunnan-fu, was no better. The original detachment of some 700 men which accompanied the Wei Hsi Sub-Prefect to Atentse in June was well armed with an old type of Mauser; but the missionaries at Tseku report that discipline was conspicuous by its absence, and, as Mr. Forrest puts it, the whole affair became a
squeezing" and a looting expedition from the start.
Owing to the practice of seizing transport animals without payment, and of pillaging the bazaars, trade is almost at a standstill, even in this district, while at and near Wei Hsi the inhabitants have fled into the mountains, removing their beasts and stores of grain. Thus famine is threatened in addition to other miseries.
The total force now collected near Wei Hsi, including the original Atentse detachment, is some 2,500 men. Every one-and no one more vigorously than the Prefect of Ta Li-denounces their total want of discipline, and ascribes to their misconduct the troubles which have taken place. For the scandalous condition of the forces the Governor-General at Yunnan-fu is most certainly responsible, as he had received repeated and ample warning of the approach of trouble from his own officials and from the French missionaries.
When the Wei Hsi Sub-Prefect reached Atentse early in May, he began by treacherously beheading the Chief Thibetan of the place. This incident seems to have been far more important than I had previously reported. The executed Headman is said by the French to have been meditating rebellion, but the Chinese traders from Atentse and Wei Hsi declare that this was not true. However this may be, this treacherous execution, though, as it is reported, authorized by a secret warrant from Yunnan-fu, had a most unhappy effect, and was not followed up by vigorous action on the part of the Chinese, who, on the contrary, sat down at Atentse and made no further political move.
The unfortunate chief who was thus summarily put out of the world was the brother of one of the leading lamas of Atentse, and a relative by marriage of one of the leaders of the Batang sedition. After the execution the Atentse lamas dispersed in various directions to raise their dependents, and stir up the other lamaseries in the neighbourhood. The Chinese seem to have been too busy in extorting money to pay attention to what was going on, or to take measures to keep open their communica- tions. The wife of the murdered Chief took a leading part in fomenting the revoli, which broke out in the middle of July, as soon as the barley harvest had been gathered in. The Chinese troops appear to have made little or no resistance, and were driven in, it is said, with some slaughter, to the little town of Atentse, where they were surrounded and remained cut off for over six weeks, when the bulk of them, together, it is reported, with the Wei Hsi Sub-Prefect, escaped by mountain tracks to Wei Hsi, eight stages to the south. News of their escape only reached Ta Li on
the 7th.
It seems to me that their conduct, or their misconduct, requires more explanation than the Chinese Government is ever likely to get. The insurgent lamas in Yunnan do not probably number more than 4,000 or 5,000.
Events on the Mekong; murder of Europeans; position of the Li Chiang Prefect.-- At the same time that Atentse was surrouuded, the roads along the Mekong, between Wei Hsi and the Mission at Tseku, were destroyed. As these roads are but narrow tracks along precipices, in some places carried past the cliffs on brackets of wood, their total destruction was an easy matter.
The Prefect of Li Chiang, Li Hsing Sheng, who had established himself at Wei Isi since the departure of his subordinate, the Sub-Prefect of Wei Hsi, for Atentse,
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addressed a series of telegraphic reports to Yünnan-fa, but it now appears that these reports were mainly based on mendacious statements of villagers or frightened refugees. The country north of Yetehe was wholly eut off from about the 18th July to the end of August. The worthy Prefeet also spoke of his "cavalry" and his "batteries," bat there was no cavalry, no battery, no infantry. The Prefect had been solemnly promised a force of 500 well-armed troops from Yunnan-fu in May, and it was on the strength of this that he had sent all is available forces and arms forward to Atentse, but the Viceroy at Yunnan had played him false, and the unlucky Prefect was left almost entirely alone and without support at Wei Hsi till nearly the end of August, and then he was provided, as I have described above, with a rabble consisting of the scum of the thieves and loafers of West Yünnan. Prefect Ii is the man on whom the brunt of the responsibility will fall, but he is really far less to blame than the Viceroy, who is guilty of gross negligence and misgovernment, or the Wei Hsi Sub-Prefect, who is guilty of systematic misconduct. The Prefect is an honest man, who has always, during a long and hitherto successful administration of a difficult post, had a definite policy of asserting Chinese authority over the lamas. But he has committed serious errors of judgment. He trusted his superiors at Yunnan-fu, and his subordinates at Wei Hsi, and in both cases was deceived. He greatly overrated the efficiency of his troops and underrated the strength of the lamas and their adherents. None of the French missionaries believe for a moment that Prefect Li would have willingly permitted or abetted the murder of Europeans, and in this opinion I concur.
The lamas having collected their barley and their dependents, and having cut off the troops at Atentse, proceeded to descend to the Mekong and attack the large French mission station at Tseku. The fathers, deceived by several of the local Headmen, who were secretly in the interests of the lamas, had been lulled into a feeling of false security. A guard of forty soldiers with rifles had been provided, but had been withdrawn to Atentse carly in July by the Wei Hsi Sub-Prefect. It was only on the 17th July that the fathers became seriously alarmed, and urged Mr. Forrest, their English guest, to depart. Mr. Forrest refused, and determined to stand by them. All the missionaries except the aged Father Dubernard and Father Bourdonné (who appears quite to have lost his presence of mind at the last) were absent at an out-station when the crisis came. Those two missionaries and Mr. Forrest, with the native Christians, escaped on the night of the 19th, only two or If the three hours before the lamas appeared and destroyed the mission house. refugees and made the best use of their legs, as Mr. Forrest urged them to do, they would all have escaped south along the right bank of the Mekong, but they stopped to rest, to cook rice, to weep over the destruction of their homes, to negotiate with treacherous. Headmen, and so lost twelve hours of precious time. The country soutli of Tseku consists of a series of valleys or bays in the hills, each cut off north and south by high sharp ridges, and closed to the west by lofty precipices, and to the east by the roaring flood of the Mekong. The lamas, knowing the mountain tracks, got ahead of the refugees and occupied a ridge, thus hemming them into a valley some 4 miles by 1 to 2 broad. In the rush which followed Mr. Forrest became separated from the rest. Flis servant bolted, and he was left alone with his rifle and some cartridges. For seven days he was tracked and hunted like a wild beast by the lamas; he had to throw away his boots to prevent being tracked, and with the exception of a few ears of corn, he was entirely without food. The lamas patrolled the crest of the valley with dogs, and lit bonfires at night, which made escape impossible until some of them finally gave up the search, and Mr. Forrest was rescued from his perilous position by the pluck and skill of some Lisu tribesmen. Later he was succoured by the friendly Headman of Yetehe, further down the Mekong. At last he arrived at Wei IIsi, 90 miles south of Tseku, twenty-one days after his flight. The worthy Prefect did all he could to alleviate his sufferings, and supplied him with money, food, clothing, and escort.
Père Dubernard, who seems to have been unwilling to survive the destruction of the Mission, where he had lived for forty years, was, it is reported, brutally murdered and decapitated, while it is said that Père Bourdonné met à like fate, but there is no "trustworthy eye-witness of the murder, and the only reason for believing that the fathers are dead is the extreme împrobability that they can be alive.
The bitter hostility of the lamas against the French missionaries is easy of explanation. Directly any disturbance arose in the country, it was certain it would take an anti-missionary direction. The existence of the Mission, the lives led by the missionaries, and the great influence which they had gained in the country-side all
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